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Taking and Perfecting Security Interests in
Collateral Subject to Specialized Rules: Deposit Accounts,
Commercial Tort Claims, Intellectual Property
Steven 0. Weise and Neil G. Williams,
with Allen Richard Kamp as moderator
ABRAHAM FENG ZHOU: Thank you, Professor Franklin.
Thank you, Professor Greenberger. Now we have our second panel,
which is the first panel in the afternoon. The subject matter is taking
and perfecting security interests in collateral subject to specialized
rules.
In this panel, we are honored to have two panel speakers and one
moderator. We will have Mr. Steven Weise, who flew from California
yesterday to join us, and we have Professor Neil Williams from Loyola
University School of Law to join us as a co-panel speaker, and we also
have Professor Allen Kamp from the John Marshall Law School as
panel moderator. Thank you.
ALLEN KAMP: Isn't the original idea of simplicity? Again, I think
the answer to that is "yes," but whether or not this is a good thing or a
bad thing I think is debatable. But another thing for the topic today is
that the point of the Code was sort of the creation of the unitary-or a
big part of Article 91-was the creation of the unitary security interest
and that is that you would have one security form that would cover
really all sorts of collateral.
Now, they did not quite get there, but they were trying do that. But
I just wonder. And then if you read the Code again, which I said I did
for the first time after several years because I was going to teach part
of it. I was sort of shocked to find out there are all these sort of weird
types of collateral, which I had no idea what they were talking about.
I still do not really understand most of the stuff. So are we getting
away from this idea? Is that a good thing? I mean, do we really need
these specific individual rules for these specific types of collateral, and
that is something I would like to ask.
Now, once again, one can argue that yes, we do, saying to people,
you know, it is not one size fits all. But I think we are all drifting away
or purposely going away from the original ideals of the UCC and get-
1. U.C.C. § 9 (2001).
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ting kind of back to a pre-Article 9 system, which I think Grant Gil-
more said was sort of the wood, the sticky end wood which Dante
encountered before he entered hell and it was just sort of a true mess.
Anyway, I would just like for the esteemed panelists to just discuss
a little bit: Do you think we are heading in the right direction or are
we going in the wrong direction? Should we go back to the good old
Article 9, which is to become more conservative as we get older? If it
was good enough for Grandpa, it is good enough for us, right? Thank
you.
NEIL WILLIAMS: Thank you very much. You are right. Sticky
wood is complex. When I first started teaching the course, it was so
much easier to teach. There were a few core ideas and they extended
pretty much across types of collateral. I am honored to be on a panel
with Mr. Steve Weise, because he can certainly provide us some back-
ground perspective on what the drafters were thinking.
What I am going to cover in-what we are covering in this block-
are how you go about taking security interests in deposit accounts,
commercial tort claims, and intellectual property rights under Article
92 as it now exists. And before we can really have a conversation
about this, we have to grapple with these complex rules. So what I am
going to do in my part of the presentation is basically provide some
structure. I am going to give a fact pattern which will guide us
through the application of some of these principles; but I will have to
admit Steve Weise has even helped me along. There were some things
in my fact pattern that I hadn't taken into account. He is going to
elucidate. And once we have that framework, Steve is going to come
in with his insights and resubmit the answers in the case law.
First of all, in thinking about collateral, what you have to do is situ-
ate it in your mind in the scheme of Article 9, and again, it is not as
simple as it once was but I am going to briefly just go over the struc-
ture of Article 9 collateral using some mnemonics that I find helpful
because as I tell my students, if you can keep it in your mind, you are
most likely to apply the correct rule, particularly with respect to mat-
ters like deposit accounts, commercial tort claims, and intellectual
property.
First of all, the structure of Article 9 focuses on certain types of
collateral. Some types of collateral are subject to perfection by pos-
session, things that are tangible that you can hold on to. There is a list
certainly in § 9-313,3 and the item listed in § 9-3134 will be subject to
2. Id.
3. Id. § 9-313.
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perfection by possession and can also be perfected by filing, except as
indicated.
I am a jazz fan and so I tell my students, in thinking about the list of
collateral set out in § 9-313,5 think of something that would be abhor-
rent to true jazz fans: You are at a concert watching the great Charlie
Parker play disco music. And someone shouts out, "Man, good disco,
Charlie Parker!" And what are the types of collateral subject to pos-
session under § 9-313?6 Goods will be goods and, of course, the four
subcategories of goods. The disco, you have to remember that the 0 is
silent so man, good disco, the D is for documents, the I is for instru-
ment, the SC is for stock certificates, or more broadly, certificated se-
curities. "Man, good disco, Charlie Parker," well, the Charlie Parker
collateral will be, of course, chattel paper.
Then you have the money, however, it is the only type of possession
collateral that cannot be perfected by filing a financing statement.
Next, you get to the types of collateral subject to perfection by con-
trol, which is a relatively new concept introduced in the 2001 amend-
ments, and I am very happy to have Mr. Weise's insights on these
categories of collateral.
Again, just so you can keep in mind, have a framework. Once
again, I have a mnemonic: "DAs in Philadelphia encounter danger
establishing criminal procedure, lots of cases." So which types of col-
lateral are subject to perfection by control under § 9-314?7 Well, de-
posit accounts, those are the "DAs." "In Philadelphia," investment
property, which will, of course, also include certified securities. Elec-
tronic documents are the "encountering danger." "Establishing crimi-
nal procedures," is electronic chattel paper. In "lots of cases" is letter
of credit rights. The interesting thing about the order that I have es-
tablished is that the first and last items of this list, deposit accounts
and letter of credit rights, may only be perfected by control. You can-
not, and we will be focused on deposit accounts in particular, perfect a
security interest in a deposit account by filing a financing statement.
After that, if you have collateral that is not listed in § 9-3138 as be-
ing subject to perfection by possession, and it is not listed in § 9-3139
to being subject to perfection by control, you have everything else left
over. In particular, you will have accounts and commercial tort
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. U.C.C. § 9-313.
7. Id. § 9-314.
8. Id. § 9-313.
9. Id.
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claims, which I, again, will focus on specifically; general intangibles,
and the three types of general intangibles in particular often are the
subject of interest, payment intangibles, software (if it is not embed-
ded in goods), and intellectual property rights, which I will also be
talking about: copyrights, trademarks, and patents.
I also have a little mnemonic for this one. If you put accounts first,
you can say, "Accounts contract flaming generous interest payments
in South Indiana Property," the "Indiana property" being intellectual
property rights. So again, just so you can keep it in mind and note if
you have collateral that cannot be possessed and cannot be controlled;
inferentially that means the only way to perfect a security interest is
by filing a financing statement.
Before we go through the fact pattern, I would also want to focus
your attention with respect to commercial tort claims on § 9-204,10
which will provide that an after-acquired property clause cannot at-
tach a security interest to a commercial tort claim. Also in relation to
commercial tort claims, a specialized rule that will be applied is the
one in § 9-108(e),1" which says in describing commercial tort claims
you cannot do so generically. You have to have a rather specific
description of the commercial tort claim.
It is one thing to have these things set out in general. It is another
thing to try to apply them. I have a fact pattern for you that will help
us navigate through some of these rules in a context. In this fact pat-
tern-I'll try to keep it interesting-but you have a debtor in a state
that honors vegans. And her name is Cara Carrot and she is going to
start up a vegan restaurant business.
She actually has come up with a novel idea and that is that you can
have a mushroom and barley mixture, which will perfectly simulate
the taste and texture of a sirloin steak. It would be my dream to be
able to eat vegetables and have them taste like a sirloin steak. So she
was issued a patent certificate, which we call Patent Certificate
ABCD. This will be our illustration, generically speaking, for intellec-
tual property rights.
She then takes a loan from Filing Statement Finance, and Filing
Statement Finance, in accordance with its name, is going to try to per-
fect a security interest in these various categories of collateral by filing
a financing statement. So it files a financing statement in an attempt
to perfect a security interest in the deposit account, Account 1234,
with Account National Bank. It also files a financing statement in an
10. Id. § 9-204.
11. U.C.C. § 9-108(e) (2001).
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attempt to perfect a security interest in all of Cara Carrot's commer-
cial tort claims and it also files a financing statement in an attempt to
perfect a security interest in Account 1234.
And we are going to see, interestingly, that there are going to be
issues with respect to whether or not this filing properly perfects a
security interest in relation to all three of these categories of collat-
eral. So the old Article 9, the simple idea that you can file a financing
statement and for the most part perfect a security interest of just
about anything certainly is now by the wayside.
Next up is a lender, we will call Control Agreement Capital, and
you will see it is given that name for a reason. Control Agreement
Capital also attempts to take a security interest in Account 1234. It
does so by entering into an agreement involving the debtor, Control
Agreement Capital, the secured party, and Account National Bank,
the bank at which the account is maintained. And in this control
agreement, Account National Bank agrees to follow any instructions
from Control Agreement Capital directing the disposition of funds in
Account 1234 without further consent from Cara.
This agreement further specified that any such instructions from
Control Agreement Capital regarding the disposition of funds in Ac-
count 1234 would have to be accompanied by a certification from
Control Agreement Capital that Cara was in default. Next up is Ac-
count National Bank itself, the bank at which the account is main-
tained, which also attempts to get a piece of a security interest in
Account 1234 and it attempts to take a security interest in Patent Cer-
tificate ABCD. Account National Bank, the bank at which the ac-
count is maintained, attempts to take possession of Patent Certificate
ABCD. So the issue will be: to what extent will that work?
Next up will be Bank's Customer Finance. It too is named to re-
present the fact that it is going to attempt to elect to take a security
interest in Account 1234 by means of becoming the bank's customer
in relation to Account 1234. Note, and I had an interesting point by
Steve Weise in this type of situation, the agreement that Bank's Cus-
tomer Finance has with the bank should have a stipulation that if
there is a conflict between instructions from the Bank's Customer se-
cured party and the debtor, that the Bank's Customer secured party's
instructions should override those of the debtor in order for this ar-
rangement to work as a means of establishing control.
On June 1, a vegan food critic with a website called Collard
Green-and I will leave it up to people far beyond me to determine
whether this particular tort claim might be meritorious-but he says
some things which arguably would be the basis of a slander or a liable
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suit by Cara Carrot, and she, in the fact pattern, is careful to make
sure that she is bringing the claim in relation to damage to her busi-
ness interests. As we will see, this will give rise to a commercial tort
claim. It turns out the damage done by this report by Collard Green is
considerable. Vegan action group VETA pickets her business. She's
forced to file for bankruptcy. So in this context we are going to have
to determine who is properly perfected and who has priority in rela-
tion to these various categories of collateral.
I have several questions and I have written out brief analyses of
these questions, which you can read in more detail later on. But for
now, I will just give the gist of them. Well, the first thing is whether
Account 1234 is a deposit account. It is in one of these special catego-
ries of collateral called a deposit account, and before 2001 deposit ac-
counts could not serve as original collateral. But under the structure
of new Article 9, deposit accounts can serve as original collateral.
Also in relation to deposit accounts, there is an applicable scope
provision. Deposits accounts cannot be used as collateral in a con-
sumer transaction. And here is the brief analysis: Yes, it is a deposit
account. The Code basically defines the term of deposit account to be
a standard bank account. But not every transaction involving the use
of a deposit account is original collateral. It is covered by Article 9.
Again, I point out under § 9-109(b)(13),1 2 there is an exclusion for
consumer transactions.
So if the bank account is a personal bank account, the bank account
is being held for personal use and the loan is being used for personal
family or household use, then you would have a consumer transaction
and Article 9 would exempt that transaction from the scope of the
Code. So in this particular fact pattern, we would not have a problem
because the bank account is a business bank account and all the loans
are for business purposes.
Then we ask: (1) does Filing Statement Finance have a perfected
security interest in Account 1234, and (2) whether the answer to this
question would change if Account 1234 were represented by a certifi-
cate of deposit? And this is where all that structure I went through
with you to keep all of these things in mind will come into play. You
will remember our little ditty that "DAs in Philadelphia will encounter
danger establishing criminal procedure, lots of cases," that the first
and last elements of that little ditty, deposit accounts and letter of
credit rights, are collateral that are only subject to perfection by
control.
12. U.C.C. § 9-109(b)(1) (2010)
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You cannot perfect a security interest in a deposit account by filing
a financing statement. This means that Filing Statement Finance does
not have a perfected security interest in Account 1234. If Account
1234 were represented by a certificate of deposit, the analysis might
change because a certificate of deposit under the structure of the
Code is basically recognized as being the bank's promissory note.
I will say, and I am sure Steve Weise will emphasize, as the term
promissory note is used in the structure of the Code we mean a nego-
tiable promissory note. So if you had a certificate of deposit which
was nonnegotiable, you might reach a different result and, indeed, one
of the cases has. Of course, a negotiable promissory note is an instru-
ment, and instruments, as you will recall, is a category of collateral
subject to perfection by either possession or filing a financing state-
ment. It is the "I" in "disco."
Next question is: does Control Agreement Company have a per-
fected security interest in Account 1234, and would it have a perfected
security interest if Cara was also required to join in corroborating her
status as being in default? And also in relation to control agreements:
will a control agreement be allowed to substitute for attachment pur-
poses for § 9-203's'3 general requirement that there be a written,
signed security agreement?
Control Agreement Capital has a perfected security interest in Ac-
count 1234 because it is in control, but let me emphasize in this regard
Steve Weise's point: make sure that the language is such that it is clear
that any instructions from Control Agreement Capital, once it has as-
serted control, will override any contrary instructions from the debtor.
But at least I attempted to draft this so it will effectively create a con-
trol agreement, which would give Control Agreement Capital priority.
The control agreement in the above fact pattern is authenticated by
the traditional method of signing a tangible writing, but Article 9 is
now flexible enough to permit-I believe some of this language was
just added by the amendments-to permit the authentication of
records including electronic and cyber documents in a variety of ways,
including logically associating the record with an electronic sound,
symbol, or process. Section 9-203(b)(3)(d) 14 provides that if there is
an authenticated control agreement, there is no need to have an au-
thenticated security agreement for attachment purposes.
Next up, does Account National Bank have a perfected security in-
terest in Account 1234? And indeed, it does, because ANB is the
13. U.C.C. § 9-203 (2001).
14. Id. § 9-203(b)(3)(d).
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bank at which the account is maintained and therefore entitled to con-
trol status under § 9-104.15 Does Bank's Customer Finance have a
perfected security interest in 1234? And this is something on which I
would like Steve Weise to elaborate-I ask my former students who
now work in the real world-What is going on with regard to the use
of bank accounts as original collateral? I ask them if any of them ever
had a client who elected to become the bank's customer in relation to
one of these transactions. They respond, "Professor Williams, this
does not happen." But I want to know from you: Does it happen?
STEVEN WEISE: It happens pretty rarely because the bank is
afraid it is going to have to pay taxes on the interest in the account so
they will rarely do that. They prefer to use the control agreement,
which I think is sort of backwards because you are always fighting
with the bank where the deposit account is maintained to negotiate
the control agreement because they have got a form. They do not
want to change it, and life is difficult.
And when they do not cooperate, what we end up doing is threaten-
ing to take the account to another bank that will be more cooperative.
But very rarely does the bank become the customer-the secured
party, rather, becomes a customer.
NEIL WILLIAMS: Okay. But it can happen and now that we have
been exposed to your real life experiences, we know it is possible. I
am sure the practitioners out there, if you have ever been in a situa-
tion where you have a client who wants to become the bank's cus-
tomer in order to control an account, I would say call Steve Weise.
If it is done properly, Bank's Customer Finance will have a per-
fected security interest in Account 1234 by virtue of becoming the
bank's customer in relation to the account. And let me emphasize, as
Steve Weise did to me, that there would need to be a provision in that
agreement with the bank which would provide that the Bank's Cus-
tomer secured party's instructions would override any contrary in-
structions from the debtor. But when this is done, you would end up
with Bank's Customer Finance being properly perfected by virtue of
this control agreement.
Then we get to the priority questions, and these are interesting, too,
and correct me because I was not quite sure that these rules made
sense. But let's try to apply them. Does Control Agreement Capital
or Account National Bank have priority in Account 1234? They are
15. Id. § 9-104.
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all perfected by control. I would argue § 9-327(3)16 is giving Account
National Bank priority over the control agreement party.
STEVEN WEISE: That is right, because when the secured party is
the customer and the account is the secured party's account, then it is
not the borrower's account anymore, so that even though the bor-
rower has an interest in the value of the account, the bank, in the
control situation, in effect has a security interest in something that is
not really the borrower's as a matter of ownership rights anymore. So
that is right. When the secured party is the customer, that gives it the
best priority of all.
NEIL WILLIAMS: Okay. And that is the way the rule works.
Then we have priority battle between Bank's Customer Finance or
Account National Bank. In this case, Bank's Customer Finance will
beat out Account National Bank under § 9-312(4).17
And this is the one I am going to need your help on, because
whether Control Agreement Capital or Bank's Customer Finance
have priority in Account 1234, I read § 9-372 1 8-the residual-as
coming into play, and it would give priority to the first party to estab-
lish control. And under the fact pattern, as I have it, Control Agree-
ment Capital was first in time. But that would create somewhat of a
conundrum because you would have a situation where Bank's Cus-
tomer Finance would beat out Account National Bank while Account
National Bank would beat out the control agreement party, but none-
theless the control agreement party would beat out the Bank's Cus-
tomer party.
STEVEN WEISE: Remind me how Bank's Customer Finance
perfected.
NEIL WILLIAMS: Right. It becomes the customer.
STEVEN WEISE: Yeah. They are going to win because the first to
obtain control rule is a subordinate rule to the rule that says a control
agreement loses to the secured party who is a customer. So it is-I
will talk about this in a few minutes about complexity.
NEIL WILLIAMS: All right. I am looking forward to your discus-
sion of that one.
STEVEN WEISE: I will come back to that.
NEIL WILLIAMS: Yes. Then there is a tort claim against Collard
Green, and is it a commercial tort claim as defined in Article 9?
16. Id. § 9-327(3).
17. Id. § 9-312(4).
18. U.C.C. § 9-372 (2001).
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Yes. A commercial tort claim, if it is a tort claim brought by an
organization, like a corporation, would automatically be deemed a
commercial tort claim. When the claimant is an individual operating a
business, a tort claim is a commercial tort claim if it arises in the
course of the claimant's business, and it does not include damages for
personal injury or death. In this case, Cara's claim is for damage done
to her business interests, but again, I would look forward to it if you,
Steve, have any further comments on how commercial tort claims
work.
Then the interesting question: remember again, we have Filing
Statement Finance attempting to perfect its security interest in this
commercial tort claim by filing a financing statement, while commer-
cial tort claims are in that category of collateral that is not listed in
§ 9-31319 so it cannot be possessed; it is not listed in § 9-314,20 So it
cannot be controlled, which means the only way to perfect a security
interest properly in a commercial tort claim would be by filing a fi-
nancing statement.
But you have to keep in mind the special attachment provisions in
relation to commercial tort claims. And, of course, in order to be-
come perfected, a security interest must first attach.
And there are two problems here: One, § 9-20421 provides that an
after-acquired property clause cannot attach a security interest to a
commercial tort claim. The idea with commercial tort claims, and I
am sure Steve Weise can give us further background on this, is that it
should be a claim that is already in existence, and it should be specifi-
cally described, hence the further requirement in § 9-108(e) 22 which
says that for attachment purposes in a security agreement a commer-
cial tort claim should be specifically described. So despite filing a fi-
nancing statement, Filing Statement Finance does not have a
perfected security interest in the commercial tort claim in this fact
pattern.
Next up, Patent Certificate ABCD, a representative of intellectual
property rights, which will be the general intangibles. They are listed
in § 9-31323 or § 9-314,24 and they are accounts or commercial tort
claims, hence they are general intangibles. And the way you would
generally perfect a security interest in a general intangible is by filing
19. Id. § 9-313.
20. Id. § 9-314.
21. Id. § 9-204.
22. Id. § 9-108(e).
23. U.C.C. § 9-313 (2001).
24. Id. § 9-314.
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a financing statement. The issue here, however, is the financing state-
ment was filed in a state Article 9 office, and there are at least some
cases which suggest in relation to intellectual property rights under
certain circumstances, that in order to properly perfect a security in-
terest, paperwork needs to be filed at the federal level.
Mr. Weise has some very interesting cases in this regard, and I know
that you are all anxiously awaiting his presentation. So now, Steve
[Weise), I look forward to hearing your comments.
STEVEN WEISE: Thank you. One of Allen's questions first is:
Did we make a mess out of Article 9 when we revised it a dozen or so
years ago?
I am going to go back even further in time to before the original
Article 9 which was completed in the late 50s and early 60s. Before
that, the secured transaction system in the United States was a variety
of laws, none of which coordinated with each other. So the great
beauty of the original Article 9 was what Allen referred to, which was
the unified concept of a security interest, which brought together in a
single statute-Article 9 of the UCC-all these different laws. There
was the Uniform Trust Receipts Act and pledge acts and all sorts of
different laws that sort of knew each other existed, but to establish
priorities as between rights created under different laws in dealing
with proceeds of other collateral, it just did not work very well.
So the brilliant insight of the original Article 9, when I was still
pretty young and more worried about playing baseball in the street,
was to create this unified system. But when the original Article 9 was
put together, some kinds of collateral were kept out. Deposit ac-
counts, except in Hawaii, California, Illinois, and Idaho, were outside
of Article 9, and that is because the bank said, "We do not want to be
messing with secured parties so just keep deposit accounts out of that
Article 9 of yours and we have our setoff rights against them. We do
not care about security interests."
So the original Article 9 did not cover deposit accounts and then the
original Article 9 did not cover tort claims-and we are talking about
commercial tort claims here in part at that time because people
thought, "Who would take the security interest in a tort claim? What
is the purpose of that? Because that is not a very easy-to-value kind
of collateral." So when the revisions came along in the late 1990s,
security interests in deposit accounts worked very well in the four or
five states that allowed it and the drafting committee said, "Well, let's
fold that in all together." There was still some resistance. Some of the
banks still did not like the idea, so we did this sort of half a loaf, which
is that you can perfect a security interest in a deposit account only by
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control, as Neil Williams was just talking about, but not through filing
a financing statement.
So the idea was if you really cared about it, then you would get your
control agreement or become the customer at the bank where the de-
posit account was located. You would satisfy those requirements. If
you did not really care, and you were just lazy and all you wanted to
do was have a financing statement, then you were not going to get
perfection in the deposit account. You might note in Canada, our
neighbors to the north, you can perfect a security interest by filing the
Canadian equivalent of a financing statement to perfect a security in-
terest in a deposit account.
And then further, the consumer interests at the Article 9 drafting
committee a dozen years ago did not want to permit security interests
in deposit accounts because they were afraid that consumers would
grant security interests in their deposit accounts, and it would be too
easy and they would end up losing their deposit accounts. So con-
sumer deposit accounts and consumer transactions were also excluded
from Article 9, but in our view, bringing deposit accounts into Article
9 was an advance because without deposit accounts in Article 9, there
was a common law of security interests in deposit accounts, and if you
think it is bad to have a complicated statute dealing with how you get
and perfect a security interest in a deposit account, when you've got a
bunch of judges making up the rules based on their intuition on how
we ought to perfect a security interest in a deposit account, then you
are in real trouble.
So we think we straightened out the law a little bit in that area, and
then same thing with tort claims: A lot of states provided that you
could not assign a tort claim because it was personal to the person
who was injured, and that was sort of an old-fashioned English com-
mon law rule. And businesses have tort claims, so we thought, "Let's
bring tort claims in."
The early drafts of the 2001 revisions to Article 9 covered tort
claims, and then my telephone rang one day and it was a fellow who
was the chair of the American Bar Association's tort law section, and
he said, "You cannot bring tort claims into Article 9 because you will
have all these personal injury claims, and in the courtroom will be
sitting at the plaintiff's table the plaintiff's tort lawyer and sitting right
next to him or her will be the secured lender's lawyer whispering in
the ear of the tort lawyer messing up how we handle the plaintiff's tort
claim."
So that is just not good. You cannot do that. So the compromise
was to exclude personal injury claims from Article 9 but to include
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commercial tort claims on the theory that we Article 9 lawyers would
not mess up things too much as we were anticipated to do with per-
sonal injury claims. So we reached that sort of funny compromise and
then had those other rules that Neil Williams referred to where you
have to describe the claim with some specificity. You cannot say "all
commercial tort claims," and you cannot have an after-acquired com-
mercial tort claim.
And it is hard to describe what an after-acquired claim is when it
has not happened yet, so it is pretty impossible to get next week's
commercial tort claim, which is one of the fact patterns here. But by
bringing commercial tort claims in also we thought we were sort of
making Article 9 more unified, so to speak, in covering more claims,
even though we had some funny rules.
With regard to all these complicated rules on priorities in deposit
accounts-Is there a control agreement? Is the secured party the cus-
tomer? Is the secured party the bank where the deposit account is
located?-This goes back to what Steve Harris talked about this
morning, which is that we had all these people in the room and the
banks said, "Well, if you are going to allow security interest in deposit
accounts, we want to win if it is at our bank." And so we wrote a rule
that basically says the bank wins. Pretty simple rule, and that was part
of the cost of getting that kind provision in there. So there was not
necessarily a huge amount of intellectual analysis here as much as
dealing with the realities of how to sort of get this by people and get
this through people.
So the whole process was pretty interesting, and as we revisited
some of this stuff recently with the recent revisions to Article 9 and
looked at how people were doing this in the real world in the ten years
or so since the earlier revisions to Article 9, we noticed that a lot of
this was done through agents. You read in the newspapers about
management companies and agency relationships all the time. In the
drafting committee the discussion of agency law consisted of about
one session. But for students, it's the first session of your business
organizations class maybe, and that is about all you know about
agency law.
And it turns out that agency law is just really important in this
world. People operate through agents, and if you read Article 1 of the
UCC you see in § 1-103,25 in that article, that the UCC says it fol-
lows-except to the extent clearly displaced by the UCC-it follows
the law of agency. So one of the changes we made in the comments in
25. U.C.C. § 1-103 (2001).
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the most recent revisions was to acknowledge or confirm what we al-
ways thought was true, but we made it clear, that one can possess
collateral, one can have control of a deposit account, through an agent
if you have properly set up the agency relationships, and we added
several references in the comments to the use of agents in all of these
areas.
So if you find yourself practicing in this area, one thing you discover
you need is a copy of a Restatement of Agency, along with other Re-
statements like Contracts. And you probably spent a lot of time with
the Restatement of Contracts in your contracts class. You might when
you start practicing someday-you can get it on the Westlaw or
Lexis-keep handy this notion of the law of agency because it turns
out to be really, really helpful and really, really useful in a lot of these
areas.
And by way of example, I am on something called the Permanent
Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, which is sort of
the board of directors of the Uniform Commercial Code, and we de-
cide when there should be amendments, and we issue interpretations
and stuff like that. And we just issued a paper on mortgage notes,
residential loans that are secured by mortgages. And there has been a
lot in the papers about how these are lost through robo-signing and all
that, and we addressed a couple of UCC issues, many of which depend
on possession of the note. Lots of rules and rights depend on posses-
sion of the note.
And it was always the rule, as clear as it could have been, that pos-
session could be through an agent, and one of the things we emphasize
in this report we just issued just a few weeks ago is that the possession
through an agent works perfectly fine if you have created an agency
relationship and if you have gone through the requisite steps to create
agency. So agency law is one of those other bodies of law that you do
have to deal with in connection with the UCC, and that is a little bit of
the theme here in this panel because we have to know about other
laws.
JASON KILBORN: Can I interject a question?
STEVEN WEISE: Sure.
JASON KILBORN: I actually teach several weeks of agency for the
reasons you suggested it, and you said a couple of times if you go
through the steps to set up the agency, well, the Restatement Second
and Third say agency is just a relationship. There is no formality at all.
There is no such thing as a step as far as I can tell. What do you mean
when you say as long as the agency has been set up?
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STEVEN WEISE: Well, I think, at least the Third Restatement,
which is the one I looked at most recently, says that agency depends
on a level of control in the relationship between the principal and the
agent. So I think to prove to a court that the control exists, I think it is
useful to have an agreement that says, "For purposes of this transac-
tion you are holding for me" and I quote, "control"-I mean, I used
the word control-"but I control your acts with respect to the kinds of
collateral that are physically in your possession." So that is the no-
tion, I think to-
JASON KILBORN: That comment is extremely useful because I
make a point of noting that control of a certificate of security by an
agent has to be by authenticated record signed by, I think, that agent.
And that rule seems to be kind of an outlier, but you just suggested I
think something quite useful which is useful even not in that context:
It is quite useful to have an actual written agreement with the agent
saying, "This is the deal, so that if we ever have to prove what's going
on later, we can do that."
STEVEN WEISE: That is right. There was a case recently, not per
se on agency, but one of the rules for financing statements is that you
have to put the name of the secured party on the financing statement
and then one of the sub-rules is that you can put a representative-it
does not say agent; it says a representative-of the security party's
name on the financing statement. So that is fine.
So there was a case where there were three secured parties jointly
making a loan and all three of their names were on the financing state-
ment. And then the financing statement lapsed after five years, which
is what they do, and only one of the secured parties was awake so it
filed a new financing statement. The other two were asleep and did
not do that. And the borrower went bankrupt and the trustee in
bankruptcy said, "Well, I will take that portion of the collateral that
the two who were asleep had a security interest in, and I acknowledge
the one who had re-filed is perfected."
So the two that had not filed said, "But the one that did file was our
representative," and the judge said, "show me the proof. Show me a
piece of paper. Show me an e-mail. Show me anything that shows
that it was your representative at the time the clean-up financing
statement was filed by the one bank that was awake." So the notion is
that it may be that control existed, but you have got to prove it to
somebody's satisfaction at some point.
So keep teaching that agency stuff. I throw this stuff out with cli-
ents and in programs and people have these vague, distant memories
of the law of agency, and it turns out to be very valuable. In this PEB
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report I just mentioned, in several places it refers to the law of agency,
but it does not say what you have to do to establish the agency
relationship.
So a little bit more on deposit accounts. We mentioned the ques-
tion is: What the heck is a deposit account? The insight I had a long
time ago when I went to a continuing education program as a new
lawyer is that a deposit account is debt of the bank to its customer.
When you put money in there, they do not take your twenty-dollar bill
and put it in a little stack and say, "This is Steve's twenty-dollar bill."
They put a little note on their books that says, "We owe Steve twenty
dollars." The twenty-dollar bill disappears, the one I deposited.
When I was in second or third grade, we took a field trip to a bank,
and we each had five dollars from our parents, and we created a bank
account. And they gave us a little bankbook. I do not think
bankbooks exist anymore. And it is stamped in there "five dollar de-
posit." And I can remember the guy from the bank saying, "Do not
lose the bankbook because then you will lose your five dollars," which
was wrong, but that is what he told us, as if, you know, the little book
was the money somehow.
Well, the bank just owes me money. Now, the certificate of deposit
is like a note that the bank issues and says, "I owe the holder of this
money," and if there is a certificate of deposit that is represented by a
piece of paper so that it can be an instrument, then it is no longer a
deposit account. It is an instrument.
And if you are in this area, you have got to be careful because a lot
of certificates of deposit these days are not represented by a certificate
even though they are called a certificate of deposit. There is just an
entry on the books of the bank that Neil's got a certificate of deposit
with us. And when they are that kind of certificate of deposit, they
are not an instrument because the definition of promissory note or
instrument is that it is going to be on paper. It is old-fashioned but
that is just the way it is.
So a certificate of deposit that is not on paper is a deposit account,
whether you like it or not, and the only way to perfect the security
interest is by the control agreement. If it is a certificate of deposit,
then it is an instrument. Then it is an instrument, and you can possess
it or you can a file financing statement to perfect that security interest.
So the rules here are really complicated. It is part of the cost of
bringing deposit accounts into Article 9. You can do it through an
agency relationship. Often you will have the secured parties, maybe
ten secured parties, who jointly make the loan. They will designate
one of them to be their agent. That person may have the deposit ac-
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count at the bank of the agent to perfect through the mechanism that
says if the secured party is the bank where the deposit account exists,
it creates control. All that works just fine. Again, it's back to agency
law and operating through an agent to make life a little bit more
efficient.
The other area where there has been a lot of debate and litigation
lately is setoff, because setoff is when I owe you money and you owe
me money. If I owe you one hundred dollars and you owe me eighty
dollars, instead of my paying you one hundred and you paying me
eighty, I should just pay you the leftover, which is the twenty, and sort
of net everything out.
Banks love setoff against deposit accounts because the deposit ac-
count is the bank owing money to the customer. If the customer bor-
rowed money from the bank, the customer owes money to the bank.
Instead of exchanging money you net out everything and whoever has
the net balance gets a little bit of money but not the full amount of
money.
There have been a couple of cases lately where there has been a
dispute over whether when the bank takes a security interest in the
deposit account at the bank it somehow waived its right of setoff, and
then if the bank makes a mistake in perfecting that security interest,
the debtor says, "I got you because you waived your setoff, and you
do not have a perfected security interest so you have got to pay me,
and you do not get the money when I am in bankruptcy." So a lot of
people have been adding clauses to their agreements to say, "When
we take a security interest, we do not waive our setoff rights."
But setoff is not an Article 9 concept and like agency, it is another
body of law where you have to deal not only with the Uniform Com-
mercial Code but with related bodies of law, and we will come to
some more of that in just a second.
Now, the commercial tort claims. As we mentioned, you can take a
security interest in a commercial tort claim under the 2001 revisions to
Article 9 but not under the prior version of Article 9. But the interest-
ing question here, and this again goes to other law, is: What is a tort
claim? It is easy if you run over somebody or run into something;
everybody knows from first-year torts, that is a tort claim. But the
question is: What if you have a breach of fiduciary duty claim against
somebody? What if you have an infringement claim involving intel-
lectual property? What if you have a disclosure of trade secrets
claim?
What are those? If they are commercial tort claims as opposed to
general intangibles-other kinds of disputes-then the rules that Neil
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Williams described, you would have to be more specific in your
description. You cannot get an after-acquired commercial tort claim
as collateral.
And there are about a dozen cases in the last twenty years that talk
about that question, and they say the kind of claims that I described,
the breach of fiduciary duty, infringement of intellectual property, dis-
closure of trade secrets, are "akin to,"-that's the phrase-a tort, and
therefore we are going to treat them as commercial tort claims and
therefore they are going to be subject to the limitations in Article 9
that apply to commercial tort claims. So in creating this special set of
rules for commercial tort claims, we have in effect made a little bit of
trouble for security interests in these other kinds of claims, and this is
all part of a deal to bring tort claims into Article 9.
And there are companies out there now, and I represent some of
them, that make a business out of financing tort claims. Somebody
suing somebody on a commercial tort, could be interference with con-
tract, for example-you studied all that in your tort classes, the lender
comes in and does an analysis of the claim and puts a value on the
claim and then makes a loan and then may finance the owner of the
claim, in a sense, as they proceed with the litigation.
So this has become an awfully important area of the law that I do
not think we all had anticipated, and the place where it sneaks up on
you, if you are a tort lawyer and you are bringing a commercial tort:
You may take what people think of as an attorney's lien on the claim
on a contingent fee claim-a contingent recovery, rather, that the cli-
ent might have.
What a lot of plaintiff's tort lawyers do not realize because they
never studied Article 9 is that their claim may well be an Article 9
security interest, and in order to get and perfect a security interest in
their client's very own claim against some defendant, they need to
jump through the Article 9 hoops that Neil Williams was referring to.
And there were some cases last year where lawyers who are plaintiff's
tort lawyers who just are not familiar with this area of law did not do
that and lost out in their recovery rights against their very own clients.
And the client got a big recovery but did not pay them, and other
creditors grabbed the money.
So as we, as me, and people like me as Article 9 lawyers, have to
know other law, lawyers in the other areas have to know this kind of
subject. When the new Article 9 came in, I gave a lecture a dozen
years ago on this point, one of the lawyers in the audience raised her
hand and said, "Wait a minute. Wait a minute. My husband does that
plaintiff's tort stuff. You mean I've got to teach him Article 9?" I
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said, "Yeah. It is another great thing to talk about over breakfast.
What could be more interesting?" And I assume they went and did
that sort of stuff.
So again, none of these areas of the law exist in isolation, and part
of what I am talking about here today is understanding the relation-
ships between the different bodies of law. There are two recent cases
that have dealt with security interests in securities accounts, which will
be an account of a securities broker, which is very similar to the rules
for deposit accounts. And these two cases have made some mischief
in this area.
One of them is a case called Monticello.26 In the Monticello case
the court held-let me go back: Section 9-10827 says any reasonable
description of collateral will work and then one of the subsections to-
wards the end says, "Well, if your security interest is a securities ac-
count which is not covered by Article 8,"-because almost nobody has
ever read Article 8-"if you do not do a very good job of describing it,
you do not have to be too careful, any of the following words will
work."
What the Monticello court said was not that "any" of the following
words will work, but that "only" the following words will work, so if
you do not use the magic words-what the court thought were the
magic words-you do not even get a security interest in a securities
account. So one would worry that some other court would compound
the mistake and require some magic language for deposit accounts.
So we hope not.
And then in a case called Smith,28 there was a control agreement
case for a securities account and it requires that the securities broker,
what is called securities intermediary in Article 8, agreed, key word
was "agreed," that it would follow the instructions of the secured
party, which is the same concept you have for a control agreement for
a deposit account. And in that case the securities intermediary had
said that it would consider agreeing but they never got to agree, and
the court said that is not an agreement. And I think the court was
certainly right.
How much of an agreement do you need? Consideration and writ-
ings and all that? That is a separate question. But you do need to be
pretty careful that you need some sort of agreement as opposed to
26. Monticello Banking Co. v. Flener, No. 1:10-CV-121-R, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132300
(W.D. Ky. Dec. 13, 2010).
27. U.C.C. § 9-108 (2001).
28. Smith v. Powder Mountain, LLC, Nos. 08-80820, 08-81185, 2011 WL 2457906, (S.D. Fla.
June 16, 2011).
534 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAw JOURNAL [Vol. 10:515
what had happened there, that the intermediary said it would consider
agreeing but never agreed. It is promising. It is talking about agree-
ing but never actually getting there.
So even though these rules exist, we thought: Did we do a good job
of drafting or not? We thought the rules were pretty clear. Litigators
will say anything in litigation to try and upend the security agreement.
The counsel for the trustee in bankruptcy is looking for any angle or
any hole in the agreement, so you do just need to be terrifically
careful.
Finally, intellectual property, involves one of the great provisions of
Article 9 in § 9-109.29 This goes to the lunch discussion about preemp-
tion of federal law over state law. There is a subsection in § 9-10930
that says Article 9 is preempted to the extent federal law preempts it.
Now, you did not need to say in a state law that it is preempted by
federal law because federal law would say, "If we preempt you, you
do not have any choice in the matter." And we debated. We knew we
were saying something stupid when we wrote that, but we did it con-
sciously on the theory that like a lot of lawyers have not read Article 8
or a lot of tort lawyers have not read the UCC, a lot of secured trans-
actions lawyers may forget that there is a federal law sitting out there
that might preempt or affect Article 9.
So to the extent that, those magic legal words, to the extent federal
law preempts, then federal law preempts. Before I get to intellectual
property, the classic examples are security interests in airplanes. And
until recently one perfected a security interest in an airplane by mak-
ing a filing with the Federal Aviation Administration in Oklahoma.
Now, it was in Oklahoma because an important senator from
Oklahoma was in charge of the committee that adopted that law fifty
or sixty years ago, Senator Kerr, so the place to file was in Oklahoma,
and it created jobs in Oklahoma, and it got him reelected ten times or
whatever it might have been. So you perfected by filing with the FAA
in Oklahoma but all the other article rules, Article 9 rules, creation of
the security interests, priority of the security interests, foreclosure of
the security interest, applied. The only preemption was to the extent
of the preemption, which was the rule that you file in Oklahoma to
perfect a security interest in an airplane.
Now it has gotten more complicated in the last few years through a
convention sponsored by the United Nations. There is something
called the Capetown Convention, and the Capetown Convention tells
29. U.C.C. § 9-109 (2001).
30. Id.
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you how you perfect security interest in airplanes in any country that
is a party to the Capetown Convention-and there are fifty or sixty
countries now-and to do that you file in Ireland. You do it electroni-
cally. You do not get to go to Ireland to actually file. There is an
international filing office in Ireland. But to do it in United States, you
have to first file in Oklahoma and then file in Ireland. So good people
in Oklahoma, where my father grew up, still get their jobs in
Oklahoma. Then you file in Ireland. But again, a treaty, of course, is
part of federal law in effect, so it preempts Article 9, so to perfect in
the airplane, you do that; all the rest of Article 9 still applies.
So we had this patent on the fake steak, or maybe not-so-fake steak
if you believe the critic in the hypothetical situation, and all the old
federal intellectual property laws, of course, were written many years
ago before Article 9 existed or it was even a gleam in the eyes of
Grant Gilmore or Karl Llewellyn or any of those people. So they are
not written with all these rules that we are talking about in mind.
And then the individual federal intellectual property laws, trade-
mark, copyright, and patent, each are different from the other, so you
have to look at each of those separately. And the first problem is that
if you are talking about the owner of the intellectual property, not a
licensee but the actual owner of the intellectual property, then you
have got to see is there a federal perfection rule.
And it turns out what the cases say that if you have a registered
copyright, you have to file in the federal copyright office. But if you
have a registered patent or a registered trademark, filing in the federal
registration offices for Article 9 purposes does you no good and you
have to file a UCC financing statement. And there are plenty of cases
out there where people have filed in the wrong place on these sorts of
things.
It is doubly complicated because if you have an unregistered copy-
right, you file in the UCC office, but the minute it is registered, you
have to file in the federal copyright office. So where I live in Los
Angeles, if you are making a movie, you are constantly doing filings
on the copyright of the movie itself and the daily rushes and all that,
and until the copyrighted information is registered, you are filing in
the UCC office. Once it is registered, you are filing in the copyright
office.
And it is a little harder for copyright because in the UCC you can
say, "I hereby cover all of your intellectual property to the extent the
UCC applied." For copyrights, you have to identify by copyright
number the copyrights that are subject to the filing in the copyright
office, so it is much more of a pain and difficult to deal with.
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For patents, as I mentioned, or for trademarks you filed under the
UCC system, there is an issue that is unresolved by the cases. For a
patent, even though you file in the UCC system to protect the secured
party in the event of the borrower's bankruptcy, in order to protect
the secured party against a buyer from the borrower, you may have to
file in the patent office. So people, trying to be careful, will end up
filing in both places just to try to protect themselves.
So we've got all these rules in these sort of unusual kinds of collat-
eral. We have some complicated priority rules that apply. These are
just a byproduct, particularly in the deposit account area, of bringing
that particular kind of collateral into the UCC. The old Article 9 rules
for deposit accounts were pretty simple and actually they seemed to
work, but when everybody started focusing on it, life got more
complicated.
So, Allen, I would say we actually improved the unity of the secur-
ity interests by bringing them in and getting rid of common law rules,
but in bringing them in, we did make life a little complicated and some
of these priority rules for deposit accounts and the similar rules, which
we are not talking about today, for securities accounts, which are very
similar to deposit accounts for these purposes, are also very compli-
cated. And that is just sort of life and that is what keeps me going.
So anyway that is about it. I will be happy to take questions.
JASON KILBORN: You have several Ninth Circuit cases cited
under the intellectual property header here that simply say patent li-
censes are not property for bankruptcy purposes. I wonder what the
implication for secured financing was with those cases.
STEVEN WEISE: So have I, and I forgot to mention those. In a
license situation, Neil Williams owns the patent, and he licenses me
the right to use the patent to make whatever I am going to make that
is patented under this process. And I entered into that patent license
with Neil ten years ago. It is a twenty year license. I got a really good
deal because Neil was a startup company at that point and he was
hungry for cash. So we entered into a very low royalty license agree-
ment for me.
Now I have run into some hard times. I am going to bankruptcy,
but my license agreement is an asset because I am paying a really,
really low royalty to Neil's extremely popular product now, and if we
renegotiated that license agreement today, I would be paying a much
higher royalty, and Neil would love to get that license agreement
back. So I go into bankruptcy, and my plan is to sell my licensee
rights through the bankruptcy, get a lot of money and pay my deserv-
ing creditors absolutely everything I owe them.
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But Neil shows up in my bankruptcy court and says, "Under federal
law of intellectual property, it is not an Article 9 issue." Under fed-
eral law-and if you take an IP class, you will hear this-under fed-
eral law, a licensee does not have any property. What a licensee has is
a right not to be sued by the owner of the intellectual property for the
use of whatever rights the licensee has under the license agreement.
And these federal intellectual property cases say that because it is
not property under intellectual property law, when the licensee goes
into bankruptcy, you look at the bankruptcy code, and the bankruptcy
code says that the bankruptcy estate consists of all the property rights
of the bankrupt person. And then there is a famous U.S. Supreme
Court case called Butner31 which says that in analyzing what property
is for purposes of the composition of the bankruptcy estate, you look
to other law and see what other laws say is property. And then these
Ninth Circuit cases say that we will look to other law. We will look to
intellectual property law. For the licensee's rights, it is not property.
Therefore, it is not part of the bankruptcy estate. Neil gets his license
back. He is really happy. I am in bankruptcy, and my creditors are
very unhappy because I lost a valuable asset.
So then you go to Article 9, and Article 9 says you can create a
security interest in personal property, and then § 9-401 says you look
to other law to figure out what those property rights are. And so the
risk is that some court says that a security interest in a licensee's rights
of intellectual property may not be property for purposes of creating a
security interest under Article 9.
I do not know if there is any case that addresses that question. I
would hope it would say that is sort of ridiculous for Article 9 pur-
poses and rights are whatever the rights are. And I have got an out-
line of an article I am going to write about this someday when I have
some time. But that is the risk, because the Ninth Circuit cases in
copyrights and patents, both exclusive and nonexclusive rights, have
all said that the licensee has no property rights for bankruptcy pur-
poses. So whether that applies to Article 9, I do not know, but it is a
risk. Other questions?
NEIL WILLIAMS: Steve, in that regard, what about the definition
of general intangibles you explicitly include things in action?
Wouldn't that fit into that category?
STEVEN WEISE: It would definitely fit in the definition of general
intangibles. The problem would be preemption. If federal law says it
is not property, federal law does not care what Article 9 tries to do in
31. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979).
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the event of federal law. So that is the problem. It is a preemption
issue. And we have heard a lot about preemption at lunch, and who
knows what a court would do.
Others? Okay.
Thank you very much.
